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second epilogue-第10章

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  In regard to this question; history stands to the other sciences

as experimental science stands to abstract science。

  The subject for history is not man's will itself but our

presentation of it。

  And so for history; the insoluble mystery presented by the

incompatibility of free will and inevitability does not exist as it

does for theology; ethics; and philosophy。 History surveys a

presentation of man's life in which the union of these two

contradictions has already taken place。

  In actual life each historic event; each human action; is very

clearly and definitely understood without any sense of

contradiction; although each event presents itself as partly free

and partly compulsory。

  To solve the question of how freedom and necessity are combined

and what constitutes the essence of these two conceptions; the

philosophy of history can and should follow a path contrary to that

taken by other sciences。 Instead of first defining the conceptions

of freedom and inevitability in themselves; and then ranging the

phenomena of life under those definitions; history should deduce a

definition of the conception of freedom and inevitability themselves

from the immense quantity of phenomena of which it is cognizant and

that always appear dependent on these two elements。

  Whatever presentation of the activity of many men or of an

individual we may consider; we always regard it as the result partly

of man's free will and partly of the law of inevitability。

  Whether we speak of the migration of the peoples and the

incursions of the barbarians; or of the decrees of Napoleon III; or of

someone's action an hour ago in choosing one direction out of

several for his walk; we are unconscious of any contradiction。 The

degree of freedom and inevitability governing the actions of these

people is clearly defined for us。

  Our conception of the degree of freedom often varies according to

differences in the point of view from which we regard the event; but

every human action appears to us as a certain combination of freedom

and inevitability。 In every action we examine we see a certain measure

of freedom and a certain measure of inevitability。 And always the more

freedom we see in any action the less inevitability do we perceive;

and the more inevitability the less freedom。

  The proportion of freedom to inevitability decreases and increases

according to the point of view from which the action is regarded;

but their relation is always one of inverse proportion。

  A sinking man who clutches at another and drowns him; or a hungry

mother exhausted by feeding her baby; who steals some food; or a man

trained to discipline who on duty at the word of command kills a

defenseless man… seem less guilty; that is; less free and more subject

to the law of necessity; to one who knows the circumstances in which

these people were placed; and more free to one who does not know

that the man was himself drowning; that the mother was hungry; that

the soldier was in the ranks; and so on。 Similarly a man who committed

a murder twenty years ago and has since lived peaceably and harmlessly

in society seems less guilty and his action more due to the law of

inevitability; to someone who considers his action after twenty

years have elapsed than to one who examined it the day after it was

committed。 And in the same way every action of an insane; intoxicated;

or highly excited man appears less free and more inevitable to one who

knows the mental condition of him who committed the action; and

seems more free and less inevitable to one who does not know it。 In

all these cases the conception of freedom is increased or diminished

and the conception of compulsion is correspondingly decreased or

increased; according to the point of view from which the action is

regarded。 So that the greater the conception of necessity the

smaller the conception of freedom and vice versa。

  Religion; the common sense of mankind; the science of jurisprudence;

and history itself understand alike this relation between necessity

and freedom。

  All cases without exception in which our conception of freedom and

necessity is increased and diminished depend on three considerations:

  (1) The relation to the external world of the man who commits the

deeds。

  (2) His relation to time。

  (3) His relation to the causes leading to the action。

  The first consideration is the clearness of our perception of the

man's relation to the external world and the greater or lesser

clearness of our understanding of the definite position occupied by

the man in relation to everything coexisting with him。 This is what

makes it evident that a drowning man is less free and more subject

to necessity than one standing on dry ground; and that makes the

actions of a man closely connected with others in a thickly

populated district; or of one bound by family; official; or business

duties; seem certainly less free and more subject to necessity than

those of a man living in solitude and seclusion。

  If we consider a man alone; apart from his relation to everything

around him; each action of his seems to us free。 But if we see his

relation to anything around him; if we see his connection with

anything whatever… with a man who speaks to him; a book he reads;

the work on which he is engaged; even with the air he breathes or

the light that falls on the things about him… we see that each of

these circumstances has an influence on him and controls at least some

side of his activity。 And the more we perceive of these influences the

more our conception of his freedom diminishes and the more our

conception of the necessity that weighs on him increases。

  The second consideration is the more or less evident time relation

of the man to the world and the clearness of our perception of the

place the man's action occupies in time。 That is the ground which

makes the fall of the first man; resulting in the production of the

human race; appear evidently less free than a man's entry into

marriage today。 It is the reason why the life and activity of people

who lived centuries ago and are connected with me in time cannot

seem to me as free as the life of a contemporary; the consequences

of which are still unknown to me。

  The degree of our conception of freedom or inevitability depends

in this respect on the greater or lesser lapse of time between the

performance of the action and our judgment of it。

  If I examine an act I performed a moment ago in approximately the

same circumstances as those I am in now; my action appears to me

undoubtedly free。 But if I examine an act performed a month ago;

then being in different circumstances; I cannot help recognizing

that if that act had not been committed much that resulted from it…

good; agreeable; and even essential… would not have taken place。 If

I reflect on an action still more remote; ten years ago or more;

then the consequences of my action are still plainer to me and I

find it hard to imagine what would have happened had that action not

been performed。 The farther I go back in memory; or what is the same

thing the farther I go forward in my judgment; the more doubtful

becomes my belief in the freedom of my action。

  In history we find a very similar progress of conviction

concerning the part played by free will in the general affairs of

humanity。 A contemporary event seems to us to be indubitably the doing

of all the known participants; but with a more remote event we already

see its inevitable results which prevent our considering anything else

possible。 And the farther we go back in examining events the less

arbitrary do they appear。

  The Austro…Prussian war appears to us undoubtedly the result of

the crafty conduct of Bismarck; and so on。 The Napoleonic wars still

seem to us; though already questionably; to be the outcome of their

heroes' will。 But in the Crusades we already see an event occupying

its definite place in history and without which we cannot imagine

the modern history of Europe; though to the chroniclers of the

Crusades that event appeared as mere
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